A week can be a long time in war. Until July 27th there was growing optimism that Israel and Hamas were close to a ceasefire that would halt their ten-month conflict.
Diplomats and spies from four countries planned to hash out the details at a meeting in Rome. Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, said the talks were “inside the ten-yard line.” Israelis and Palestinians might not have followed the American-football metaphor, but many shared his sentiment.
Then a rocket fired from Lebanon killed 12 children on a football pitch in the Golan Heights. Israel retaliated by bombing Beirut’s southern suburbs, hoping to assassinate a Hezbollah commander (his precise fate is still unclear).
Hours later it killed Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, in a surprise strike on Tehran. Hopes for a ceasefire then gave way to fears of a bigger regional war.
Those fears may not yet be realized. Iran has vowed a response for Mr. Haniyeh’s killing, but it will probably be reluctant to go to war on behalf of Hamas. Israel and Hezbollah are likewise keen to avoid an all-out barrage of missiles, which would cause immense destruction on both sides of the border.
A sort of deterrence is still holding — barely. But it is getting ever harder to maintain. Combatants in the region are crossing lines that would have recently seemed uncrossable. Twice this year Israel has bombed Beirut, a city it had not officially targeted since 2006. In April Iran fired a volley of missiles and drones at Israel for the first time ever. The Middle East’s old rules of engagement have been erased. Because no one is sure about the new ones, each strike risks escalating to all-out war.
The path to averting such a conflict starts with a ceasefire in Gaza. Mr. Haniyeh’s assassination will no doubt temporarily halt the talks with Israel. But it will not change the reality in Gaza. Hamas’s fighters are exhausted and the public is desperate for relief from a war that has killed almost 40,000 people. That means whoever replaces Mr. Haniyeh will face the same impetus to make a deal with the Israelis.
But it is still unclear whether Benjamin Netanyahu wants to make one. The Israeli prime minister has prevaricated for months, fearful that agreeing to a ceasefire would switch Israel’s focus back to its internal ills, and his own trial for corruption. The hopeful view is that Mr. Haniyeh’s death gives him an excuse to declare victory and to accept a deal. With the Knesset now in recess until October, he can do that without risking a no-confidence motion that brings down his government. There is also a cynical interpretation: if you want a truce, killing your main interlocutor is a curious way to show it. Perhaps Mr. Haniyeh was too valuable a target to leave alive; or perhaps his killing was a way for Mr. Netanyahu to sabotage the talks.
The assassinations may have been feats of intelligence and operations, but they do not change Israel’s bleak strategic position. Its war in Gaza has been drifting aimlessly for months; the loss of Mr. Haniyeh, a politician who had little say over the fighting, will not weaken Hamas on the battlefield. Nor will assassinating Fuad Shukr, the Hezbollah commander, compel the group to halt its daily fire on northern Israel. A small country cannot keep battling on all fronts indefinitely.
Indeed, the choice for Israel has never been more stark. It can make a deal with Hamas in order to free the surviving hostages from Gaza, bring a measure of calm to its northern border and provide a chance for regional diplomacy. The public, senior army officers and even some right-wing lawmakers support such a step. Or it can spurn a deal in order to continue a war that could spiral out of control at any time — and probably doom the 115 hostages who remain in Gaza as well.
America has vowed to protect Israel. In recent days it quietly sent an aircraft-carrier strike group back to the Persian Gulf. Deterring Iran and its proxies is only part of the equation, though.
President Joe Biden has spent months trying to cajole Mr. Netanyahu into a ceasefire, and he has vowed to spend the final months of his presidency pursuing one. It is past time for Mr. Biden to get tough and threaten real consequences if the Israeli prime minister continues to refuse. That may clash with his pro-Israel instincts. But if he does not press Israel, the consequence may be worse for the region, including Israel itself: a ruinous conflict that no one can control.
— The Economist
