For many years, while China strategically secured minerals from around the world, the United States rarely used foreign policy to obtain the minerals it needs. That has finally changed — and dramatically so.
Within the first 40 days of President Trump’s term, he has expressed interest in acquiring Greenland for its rare earths; annexing Canada, with its vast reserves of uranium and copper; and securing control over Ukraine’s rare earths and titanium in exchange for continued U.S. support.
After the blowup between Mr. Trump and President Volodymyr Zelensky on Friday in the Oval Office, the fate of the Ukraine minerals deal is uncertain. Mr. Zelensky said he is still “ready” to sign a deal; on Monday, Mr. Trump said he did not believe the deal was dead.
Whether the Ukraine deal is eventually signed or not, incorporating minerals into foreign policy is crucial for U.S. national security. However, without dedicating government investment and diplomatic resources — as China has done — this initiative remains a hollow effort and may fail to deliver any results.
With less than 2 percent of the world’s reserves of rare earths, graphite, cobalt and nickel, the United States must work closely with resource-rich nations to make sure American companies can get the minerals they need to build, among other things, phones, batteries for electric vehicles and semiconductors.
China has similar challenges and has made minerals diplomacy central to its foreign policy. Despite accounting for only 1 percent to 10 percent of global lithium, cobalt, nickel and copper production, China imports enough to process more than 65 percent of some of these metals and 90 percent of rare earths.
This level of control is the outcome of years of strategic industrial planning and foreign policy efforts by Beijing.
Mr. Trump appears to be taking a page from China’s playbook of active minerals diplomacy. The draft agreement with Ukraine would reportedly create a fund controlled by the United States and Ukraine to receive future revenue from Ukraine’s natural resources. But if it is signed, it is not clear whether such an agreement will actually enhance U.S. mineral security. In fact, it will be decades before we see the impact of this agreement, if at all.
The United States has seemingly minimal knowledge of Ukraine’s underground resources. There is no modern mapping of the country’s rare earth deposits; the most recent surveys are believed to have been conducted 30 to 60 years ago by what was then the Soviet Union.
Without up-to-date geological data, it is impossible to determine whether these resources are economically viable for extraction. If the ore grade is too low, the deposits are too small or the byproducts aren’t valuable enough, private companies are unlikely to invest the $500 million to $1 billion needed to develop a mine and separation plant.
Moreover, under the draft agreement, Ukraine would be required to pay a percentage of proceeds from newly developed mineral assets into a reconstruction investment fund with joint U.S. and Ukraine ownership; existing mineral, oil and gas operations are to remain exempt. Given that the average time to develop a mine from resource discovery to production is approximately 18 years, it will take at least that long — four more U.S. presidential election cycles — before the United States can begin sourcing minerals from Ukraine.
There are ways to make minerals diplomacy more effective, but it will require a willingness by the U.S. government not just to strike deals but also to spend and invest, over a long period, in countries that have the mineral resources we need.
That may be a tough sell at a time of fiscal austerity and budget cuts to the federal government. But China did not build the significant competitive advantage it holds in electric vehicle manufacturing by reducing spending. One analysis found that between 2009 and 2023, the Chinese government allocated at least $230.9 billion in subsidies to help develop the nascent industry. The fruits of that effort are apparent in the domination of BYD’s electric vehicles worldwide.
So how should the American government spend the resources needed to build a competitive minerals diplomacy strategy?
First, the United States should increase the capacity of the U.S. Geological Survey to conduct geological mapping and reduce exploration risks in key regions.
